This paper is concerned with two generalizations involving negation in yes/n o (yn-)questions. The first generalization captures an interpretational difference cor related with preposed and non-preposed negation in yn-questions (Romero and Han, 2001) . Preposed negation in yn-questions contributes the implicature that the speaker believed or at least expected that the positive answer is correct, as in (1) (Ladd, 1981; Han, 1998; Btiring and Gunlogson, 2000). 1 Non-preposed negation, instead, does not necessarily give rise to this implicature (Han, 1999) : (2) can be a way of seeking information on whether John is a teetotaler.
The second generalization, originally formulated in Ladd (1981) , states that a yn-question with preposed negation Aux+n 't p ? -e.g. (6)-is intuitively am biguous between two readings: it can be understood as a question about p or as a question about 'p. This is suggested by the fact that we can add to (6) a Pos itive Polarity Item (PPI) or a Negative Polarity Item (NPI), as shown in (7) with too and in (8) with either. In (7), the intuition is that the speaker is trying to con firm or "double-check" the positive proposition p (= "that Jane is coming"). This interpretation is enforced by the presence of the PPI too, which cannot be licensed under the immediate scope of negation and which presupposes the truth of a par allel affirmative proposition ("that pat is coming"). In (8), instead, the speaker wants to double-check .p (= "that Jane is not coming"). Again, this interpretation is singled out by the use of the NPI either, which needs a c-commanding nega tion and which presupposes the truth of a parallel negative proposition ( = "that Pat is not coming"). We will refer to these readings as p-question (reading) and .p question (reading) respectively. We will call yn-questions with preposed negation and PPIs "PPI-questions" and yn-questions with preposed negation and NPIs "NPI questions" for short.
(6) Isn't Jane coming?
(7) A: Ok, now that Stephan has come, we are all here. Let's go ! S: Isn't Jane coming too?
(8) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking in our workshop on optimality and acquisition. A: Pat is not coming. So we don't have any phonologist in the program. S: Isn't Jane coming either?
It is important to keep in mind that the speaker started with the positive be lief/expectation that p both in the PPI-question (7) and in the . 3 In fact, the presence of an epistemic implicature p is a necessary condition for the p-question / .p-question ambiguity to arise. Take, for example, a yn-question with non-preposed negation like (9). The presence of too and the only antecedent propo sition "that Pat is coming" forces S's question to be about the positive proposition "that Jane is coming". As a result, the only way to understand the question, if acceptable at all, is with an epistemic implicature: Is she not coming too ? in (9) sounds like an archaic rendering of Isn 't she coming too ?:
(9) A: Pat is coming.
S: What about Jane? Is she not coming too?
The contrast in (10) makes again the point that the p /.p ambiguity arises only if the epistemic implicature is present. The epistemically unbiased scenario in (10) allows for a non-preposed question ((lOS), already seen in (4)) and for a non-preposed question with an NPI, as in (lOS'). But, as soon as we add a PPI to try to bring out the p-question reading, as in (lOS"), the question is biased and hence unsuitable in this context. The intuitive ambiguity between the p-question reading and the --,p-question reading -as well as the correlation between the ambiguity and the epistemic implicature-is summarized in generalization 2 below.
(11) GENERALIZATION 2: Preposed negation yn-questions of the shape Aux n 't p? (more generally, negative yn-questions with the epistemic implicature p) are ambiguous between a question reading double-checking p and a question reading double-checking --'p. The use of a PPI versus an NPI disambiguates the question towards the p-question reading and towards the --,p-question reading respectively.
The goal of this present paper is to address the two questions below con cerning the generalizations 1 and 2. The proposed answers are, in a nutshell, as follows:
i. What property correlated with the existence of an implicature distinguishes preposed negation from (the non-archaic use of) non-preposed negation? ANSWER: Yn -questions with preposed negation necessarily carry Verum Fo cus (as in Hohle (1992) ); yn-questions with non-preposed negation can, but do not need to, have Verum Focus. Ve rum Focus signals the presence of an epistemic implicature.
ii. Once we identify the property of preposed negation that gives rise to the epis temic implicature, how can that property interact with the rest of the elements in the sentence to derive Ladd's p-question / --,p-question ambiguity formally? ANSWER: Ladd's ambiguity is a scopal ambiguity between negation and the VERUM operator arising from Ve rum Focus. In the p-question reading, nega tion scopes over VERUM. In the --,p-question reading, VERUM scopes over negation.
Other important questions about the generalizations 1 and 2 are added be low. We will not talk about question (iii) here (see Romero and Han (2001) for an account of it). As for question (iv), it is beyond the aim of this paper to work out a formal account of it. However, at the end of this paper, we will speculate on how the proposed LF scopal ambiguity between negation and VERUM may open an avenue to explain it once some semantic/pragmatic factors are taken into account.
iii. How exactly does Ve rum Focus enforce the existence of an epistemic impli cature in negative yn-questions?
iv. Why is the implicature raised by preposed negation -both in PPI-questions and in NPI-questions-a positive implicature? That is, why is the polarity in the question and the polarity in the implicature opposite?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 tackles question (i), arguing for a correlation between Ve rum Focus in yn-questions and the presence of an epis temic implicature. Section 3, which addresses question (ii), uses Verum Focus to characterize formally Ladd's intuitive ambiguity. Section 4 presents some specula tions about question (iv). Section 5 summarizes the conclusions.
Preposed vs. non-preposed negation
In this section, we address the question of what property correlated with the exis tence of the implicature distinguishes preposed negation as in (1) (repeated below as (12» from non-preposed negation as in (2) (repeated below as (13» .
(12) Doesn't John drink?
Positive epistemic implicature: The speaker has the previous belief or expec tation that John drinks.
(13) Does John not drink? No epistemic implicature necessary.
Sentential vs. constituent negation will not do it.
A first way to differentiate between preposed and non-preposed negation would maintain that preposed negation in yn-questions is sentential negation, whereas non preposed negation is VP constituent negation, negating the event contributed by the VP. However, this analysis does not cover all the cases. In (14), negation is not just negating the event contributed by the VP and is more like a sentential negation negating the entire modal proposition. Still, (14) does not give rise to a necessary epistemic implicature, in contrast with its preposed negation version in (15) :
(14) Does John not have to go to the meeting? (-,0) No epistemic implicature necessarily.
(15) Doesn't John have to go to the meeting? (-,0)
Epistemic implicature: The speaker had the previous belief that John has to go to the meeting.
One could say that negation in (14) is indeed constituent negation. It is just that it is negating a bigger constituent than VP. But if we make this move, the distinction between constituent and sentential negation becomes murky.
Fo cus is re levant
Three facts point towards the conclusion that focus is relevant. Third, preposed negation questions share some interesting similarities with tag questions, which clearly bear Focus on the auxiliary. Note that the polarity of a question carrying an implicature and the polarity of the implicature itself are opposite:
(19) Negative yn-questions with preposed negation give rise to a positive epis temic implicature.
Positive yn-questions with focus on the auxiliary give rise to a negative epis temic implicature.
This crossed pattern of implicatures is the same as the distributional pattern of tag questions (Sadock, 1971 ): a negative tag question with doesn 't follows an affirma tive sentence, and a positive tag question follows a negative declarative. In fact, the sequence declarative + tag basically makes the same contribution to the discourse as preposed negation questions of p-question type: i.e., they convey that the speaker has a belief p and that he wants to confirm p, as in (21). 7
(21) ( ... ) The cowb ... Didn't the cowboys even finish ... They finished pretty close to 500 last year, didn't ey?
All this raises the question of whether the existence of epistemic implica tures and the crossed pattern of their polarities is related to focus, in particular to polarity focus (Verum Focus in Hahle (1992» . If so, all the necessary epistemic implicatures above could be given a unified, focus-based treatment. Can we, then, assume that there is Focus-marking on the aux+n 't cluster in yn-questions with preposed negation?
Phonetic data
In Romero and Han (2001) , we looked at phonetic data on yn-questions with pre posed negation: pitch tracks of naturally occurring data and of contextually con trolled sentences in a small experiment. There we showed that preposed negation does involve a special pitch curve different from non-focused, non-negative aux iliaries. See Appendix for a comparison between the pitch track of the regular affirmative question in (22) (low pitch for did) and that of the preposed negation question in (23) (higher pitch for didn 't): to 500 last year, didn't ey?
We have also conducted a small experiment that elicits an (unfocused) affir mative yn-question and a negative yn-question with preposed negation in appropri ate contexts. The results are given in Appendix, showing that the negated auxiliary verb has relatively higher pitch than the auxiliary verb in affirmative questions.
How do these pitch tracks map into pitch accents and into semantic Focus marking? Though the mapping is not quite clear, a couple of possibilities arise that are compatible with Focus-marking on the preposed aux + n 't cluster.
As a first possibility, the aux + n 't cluster may have direct F(ocus)-marking. In this case, the pitch track of e.g. Wa sn 't he in Hawaii? can be interpreted as including two accents relevant for us: one on the aux + n't cluster and one on Hawaii. The first accent gives us F-marking on the aux + n't cluster directly. This is what has been suggested in Hedberg and Sosa (2001) . They also found that preposed negation in yn-questions is characteristically pronounced with a higher pitch, parsed as a L+H* accent, that does not necessarily appear in the auxiliary of a regular affirmative yn-question. The authors suggest that the accented negative polarity is part of the focus -not of the topic-of the sentence.
The second accent -falling on Hawaii, as clearly signaled by the anchoring of the typical L * H-H% final interrogative contour-8 is analyzed as Focus associ ated with negation, which is a focus-sensitive operator (Kratzer, 1989) . The anal ysis of Focus associated with negation in declaratives like (24) simply carries over to preposed negation questions like (25) . No further assumptions need to be made.
(24) a. John didn't want to MArr y Bertha.
b. John didn't want to marry BERtha.
(25) a. Didn't John want to MArr y Bertha? b. Didn't John want to marry BERtha?
As a second possibility, the cluster aux + n't may have an indirect Focus marking. In this case, the pitch track for yn-questions with preposed negation con sists of a H*+L accent (or a down stepping sequence of them for longer sentences) plus the usual L * H-H% question ending. 9 No F-marking on preposed negation needs to arise from the H*+L accent, which signals saliency and inferrability ac cording to Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) . As before, the alignment of L * H-H% signals F-marking on Hawaii, and this F-marking is associated with the negation.
Note, though, that semantic Focus-marking in a focus-sensitive operator may sometimes surface as a phonetic stress on the associated item and not on the operator itself. Take, e.g., (26). Here, A is asking a regular yn-question, and con sequently the main semantic F-marking of the answer is expected to fall on the polarity. This is so in (26B) . But what about (26B')? We still need semantic F marking on the negative polarity. The point is that the main F-marking does not need to surface as the main stress on the negative element only, but it can simply surface on its associated item THEre . In view of these phonetic data and possible analyses, we will assume that yn-questions with preposed negation carry focus on the polarity, and that the pres ence of polarity focus (Verum Focus) is what triggers all the positive and negative epistemic implicatures exemplified in this paper. The assumptions are summarized below: (27) i. Polarity focus (Verum Focus, as in Hahle (1992» in yn-questions triggers epistemic implicatures. ii. Preposed negation in yn-questions has the discourse function of Focus marking the polarity (Verum Focus, as in Hahle (1992» . 10 Given that it necessarily has Ve rum Focus, an epistemic implicature necessarily arises. iii. Non-preposed negation can but does not need to be focused. Hence, the implicature does not necessarily arise.
In Romero and Han (2001) , the assumptions above are pursued to answer question (iii) from the introduction: the existence of an implicature follows from the role that polarity focus plays in signaling the discourse relation question-superquestion (Roberts, 1996) . In the present paper, we will pursue question (ii) instead: How can the property of preposed negation related to the epistemic implicature help us explain Ladd's p-question / ---, p-question ambiguity?
3 Ladd's ambiguity in yn-questions with Preposed Negation
In this section, we address the question of how the property correlated with the nec essary epistemic implicature interacts with the rest of the elements in the sentence to yield Ladd (1981 ) 's p-question / ---, p-question ambiguity, as was illustrated in the introduction (repeated below as (28) How can we formally characterize the two readings of a yn-question with preposed negation, a reading "double-checking" p and a reading "double-checking" . p ? And how can we relate this difference to the use of PPls vs NPls? There are three main interacting components in the questions above: (i) the question operator Q present in yn-questions in general; (ii) negation present in negative yn-questions; and (iii) Ve rum Focus, which we have argued is necessarily present in preposed negation yn-questions. Let us see them in tum.
The Q operator is the outermost operator in yn-questions. It takes a proposi tion as its argument and yields a question meaning, namely, (a function from worlds to) the set consisting of that proposition and its complement, as spelled out in (32) (33), u If we understand question denotations as inducing a partition on the set of common background worlds (as in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) ), the final denotation (33d) induces the partition in two balanced cells in (34). The second operator present in all negative yn-questions -with preposed or non-preposed negation-is negation itself. We will assume the usual denotation of (unfocused) negation: [not] or [n ' t] takes a proposition and yields its complement, as indicated in (35). Note that, as the computation in (36) illustrates, the interaction of negation with the lexical denotation of Q does not yield any epistemic implica ture. This is what we want, since, as we saw, non-preposed (unfocused) negation does not necessarily give rise to an implicature. The resulting partition is the same balanced partition as above. = {"that Jane is not coming", "that Jane is coming"} L-... .:. .
The final element is Verum Focus. We assume, following Hohle (1992) , that Verum Focus signals the presence of a truth predicate or operator called VERUM. Furthermore, we assume that, (at least) in the questions at issue, this VERUM op erator is not defined as an alethic operator but as an epistemic operator. That is, the denotation of VERUMi is, roughly, the epistemic operator defined in (38a) and abbreviated as "FOR-SUREx", where x is a free variable whose value is (usually) contextually identified with the addressee in our examples. This is in the spirit of (Jacobs, 1986) (cited in Hohle (1992) ), for whom the alternatives to a focused VERUM include negation and epistemic expressions like maybe, possibly, proba bly, etc, defined in (38). Given these three operators -Q, negation and VERUM-we can now explain Ladd's ambiguity as a scopal ambiguity between negation and the VERUM oper ator. We propose that, in PPI-questions, negation scopes over VERUM, whereas VERUM scopes over negation in NPI-questions. Note that Q operator will not con tribute to any scopal ambiguity because it is the outermost operator in questions.
Let us first look at NPI-questions. Here, VERUM scopes over negation. The LF and the denotation for the NPI-question in (39) are given in (40) (ignoring the presupposition contributed by either). The question denotation is schematically rendered as a partition in (4 1), taking -' p to be "Jane is not coming".
(39) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking in our workshop on optimality and acquisition. 
it is for sure that Jane is not coming", "it is not for sure that Jane is not coming" } (4 1) NPI-question partition:
The resulting denotation and partition allow us to characterize formally the intuitions about the NPI-question presented in the introduction. First, the NPI question is not a regular question but a double-checking question. This is reflected in the shape of the partition. Whereas a regular question like (36a) (with no polar ity focus and no VERUM) results in the balanced partition (37), the NPI double checking question results in the unbalanced partition (4 1): the FOR-SURE option is in one cell, and all the other epistemic options are in the other cell. The second intuition is that the question has the -,p-question reading. This is clearly captured in the partition, where -, p is the argument of all the epistemic operators. Finally, since the double-checked proposition is a negative proposition, NPIs are accept able and PPIs (under the scope of negation) are not acceptable (Ladusaw, 1980) , as illustrated in (42) for declaratives:
It is certain [that Jane is not coming either] .
b. * It is certain [that Jane is not coming too].
Let us now turn to PPI-questions. In PPI-questions, negation scopes over VERUM. The LF and the denotation for the PPI-question in (43) (ignoring again the presupposition contributed by too) are given in (44). The outcoming partition is schematically given in (45), where p is taken to be "that Jane is coming". [CP] (wo)
it is not for sure that Jane is coming", "it is for sure that Jane is coming" } (45) PPI-question partition:
As before, this is not a balanced partition for a regular question, but an unbalanced partition for a double-checking question: the FOR-SURE option is in one cell, and all the other options are in the other cell. In contrast to NPI-questions how ever, in PPI-questions, the proposition that the speaker wants to double-check is p (p-question reading) , showing that the two interrogatives really denote different questions, that is, that the p-question meaning and the -,p-question meaning are two truth-conditionally different readings. Finally, since the operator VERUM in tervenes between negation and the content of the IP, NPIs are not licensed within the IP (Linebarger, 1980) , whereas PPIs are. The same pattern is attested for the pair either/too. As illustrated in (46) for declaratives, when adjoined to a positive proposition, the NPI either is ungramm atical and the PPI too is acceptable. 14 (46) a. * It is not certain [that Jane is coming either] .
b.
It is not certain [that Jane is coming too].
Let us summarize what we have seen so far. We showed in the introduction that Ladd's p-/ -,p-question ambiguity only arises in negative yn-questions that carry an epistemic implicature. Then, in section 2, we argued that all the questions with necessary epistemic implicatures seen in this paper have Verum Focus. Once we assume the presence of a VERUM operator provided by Verum Focus, we can formally account for Ladd's p /-, p ambiguity, its correlation with the presence of PPIs vs. NPIs, and the "double-checking" feeling that all these questions have. This question can be formulated in another way. Given the fact that both PPI-questions and NPI-questions carry the positive epistemic implicature p, the choice of double-checking p or double-checking -'p correlates with whose proposi tion (i.e., speaker's or addressee's) is being double-checked: when the speaker asks the PPI-question about p in (7), she is double-checking her original belief, whereas, when she asks the NPI question about -,p in (8), she is double-checking A's implied proposition. The question then is: is there anything in the syntax/semantics/pragmatics of a PPI-question that forces its content p to be the speaker's belief, and is there any thing in the syntax/semantics/pragmatics of an NPI -question that forces its content -,p to be the addressee's proposition?
If we assume the semantics and partitions in the previous section, there is nothing in the semantics of PPIINPI-questions per se that can help us derive this result. For compare the two partitions in (41) and (45). If we forge an account to derive the speaker's epistemic implicature p from the mathematical obj ect that con stitutes the PPI partition (45), wouldn't that account wrongly derive the epistemic implicature -. p for the parallel NPI partition in (4 1)? Even more dramatically, take the positive yn-question IS Ja ne coming ? in (47), with Verum Focus on the aux iliary. If we compute its denotation (in (48» and its partition (in (49» , we obtain exactly the same mathematical partition that we had for the PPI-question (in (45» . But, contrary to the PPI-question, the positive question IS Jane coming ? has the negative epistemic implicature -' p and not the positive epistemic implicature p . [CP] (wo )
it is not for sure that Jane is coming", "it is for sure that Jane is coming" } (49) Positive question: IS Jane coming?
Hence, either we change the standard semantics of yn-questions, or we find a difference somewhere else. Here, we would like to briefly speculate about how the pragmatics of yn-questions may help (although, if the semantics of yn-questions is modified appropriately, the same idea may be stated in the semantics). First, let us note that, even if two questions yield exactly the same mathematical partition over the set of worlds in the common ground, they may differ in acceptability depending on the context (see also Bolinger (1978» . Take scenario (50) and imagine that the speaker is interested in talking about coffee if it turns out that Carlos drank coffee and not tea. In this situation, it is natural for the speaker to ask (51a) and it is unnatural for her to ask (51b). Let us say that, even though (51a) and (51b) induce the same partition, their pragmatic "intent" is different.
(50) Scenario:
Carlos is unusually nervous and irritable this morning. The speaker knows that this can be due to exactly one of the following two reasons: either he drank an overdosis of coffee this morning, or he drank an overdosis of tea. The speaker does not know which of the two possible explanations is true and she wants to find out. Furthermore, the speaker happens to have a scientific interest on the effects of coffee on people.
(5 1) a. S: Carlos, did you drink coffee this morning? b. S: Carlos, did you drink tea this morning?
Let us tum to our epistemically biased questions: the NPI-question, the PPI question, and the positive question. We saw that they differ on the proposition they are trying to double-check. But they also differ in the cell of the partition that is chosen to be pronounced, that is, they also differ in the "intent" of the question. When we cross the two parameters (double-checked proposition and pronounced cell), we obtain an interesting pattern: the intent of the question is only compatible with the desired polarity of the epistemic implicature.
Let us see each case in tum. First, take the NPI-question in (52). The pronounced cell is singled out in (53) by a double line. Given that this is the pro nounced cell, the paraphrase of the intent of question is roughly as in (52c) 
We see in (54a) that the intent of this question is compatible with the speaker's belief p and with the addressee's proposition -'p. Furthermore, it is incompatible with the opposite state of affairs, described in (54b):
(54) a. Given that I assume p and that you implied -'p, can you provide informa tion -and, if so, what information-that would make me conclude -,p? b. # Given that I assume -'p and that you implied p, can you provide infor mation -and, if so, what info-that would make me conclude -,p?
Let us now tum to the PPI-question in (55). This time, the pronounced cell with a double line-is the opposite one. The paraphrase of the intent of the question is given in (55c). Again, this pragmatic intent gives us the right result in (57) Finally, the same reasoning applies to the positive biased question IS Ja ne coming ? Crucially, although the partitions in (56) and in (59) are exactly the same, the pronounced cells are opposite. This choice makes the pragmatic intent of the two questions different: the PPI-question asks for reasons to doubt p, whereas the positive question asks for reasons to conclude that p. As a result, shown in (60), the intent of the positive question is compatible with the speaker's belief ,p and with the addressee's proposition p and not vice-versa. This is the opposite pattern from the one obtained from the PPI-question. In sum, in this section, we have sketched some speculations about how to derive the polarity of the epistemic implicature from the scopal ambiguity proposed for PPI-INPI-questions. In a nutshell, when the intent of a question is to ask for conclusive evidence for a proposition q, that proposition q is the addressee's im plied proposition and the complement proposition is the epistemic implicature of the speaker; when the intent of a question is to ask for any possible (weak or strong) doubts about a proposition q, q is the original belief of the speaker and its com plement is the addressee's proposition. This idea, combined with polarity of the "double-checked" proposition, points towards the correct implicature pattern. 17
Conclusions
We have argued that Verum Focus (Hohle, 1992) in yn-questions signals the pres ence of an epistemic implicature. Preposed negation in yn-questions necessarily carries Ve rum Focus, and hence the epistemic implicature necessarily arises. Non preposed negation in yn-questions may or may not be Focus-marked, and hence the implicature does not necessarily arise.
Ladd's p-/-.p-question ambiguity arises only in negative yn-questions with an epistemic implicature. The Verum Focus related to the implicature provides an epistemic operator VERUM. The scope of VERUM and negation accounts for Ladd (1981)'s ambiguity: in PPI-questions, negation scopes over VERUM and we obtain the p-question reading; in NPI-questions, VERUM scopes over negation and we obtain the -.p-question reading.
We have also provided some speculations as to why the polarity of the epis temic implicature is opposite from the polarity of the question. By taking in the pragmatic intent of the speaker, we argued that this implicature pattern may fall out from the interaction between the syntax/semantics of biased questions and general pragmatics of questions. The speaker will choose to pronounce the proposition that is compatible with her pragmatic intent for asking that question. Endnotes *We thank Irene Heim, Angelika Kratzer, Anthony Kroch and Barbara Partee for extensive discussion and criticism of this paper. This version has also benefited from comments from Nancy Hedberg, Mark Liberman, Bill Poser, Ellen Prince, Vli Sauerland, Juan Sosa, Mark Steedman, Amim von Stechow, Hubert Truckenbrodt, Henk Zeevat, and the audiences of Sinn und Bedeutung 6, Stanford's Department of Linguistics, SALT 12, the Penn-Tiibingen meeting and TUbingen's Department of Linguistics. All remaining errors are ours.
1 Although the epistemic effect in (1) has been dubbed "implicature", it may rather be a presupposition. We will not discuss this issue in this paper. 2 Throughout this paper, S is short for speaker, and A is short for addressee. 3 The example (3) showed that a -.p-question with preposed negation cannot be epistemically unbiased. (61) shows the same for p (="that Jane is coming (too)"). It turns out that neg-preposing with n't is a late development in the history of English, first appearing in late 17th century. Before the development of n't, neg preposing occurred with not, as in Hath not a Jew eyes ? in the passage from Mer chant of Ve nice in (62), and examples in (63) from corpus assembled by Ellegard (1953) (made available on-line by Anthony Kroch and Ann Taylor).
(63) a. dyde not our mercyfull lord forgyue all his tespasse? (225-32) b. Did not Moses geve you a lawe, and yet none off you kepeth the lawe? c. Did not I se the in the garden with hym? Gn18-26)
In present-day English, only n't can prepose, while not cannot. But the archaic usage of not may have survived, making available the interpretation corresponding to not-preposing. 5pOCUS on the (positive) auxiliary does not give rise to the implicature if it simply marks that the question is being re-asked, as in (64) (Creswell (2000) on dictum focus):
(64) I was wondering whether Sue visited you last week. So, DID she visit you last week? 6 1f the focus on NOT is simply contrasting with a previous question, as in (65), the implicature does not need to arise. As argued in Romero and Han (200 1), the implicature is necessarily triggered if focus is licensed in a particular way (namely, marking the relation between superquestions and subquestions).
(65) A: Does John drink coffee? B: No, he doesn't. A: Does John NOT drink TEA?
7 As noted in Ladd (1981) , p-question type and tag questions even share some gram matical properties: a negative declarative + post-nuclear tag allows for PPls despite negation, as we saw p-questions do: (66).
(66) Jane's not coming too=is she?
8 See also Bartels (1997) and Gunlogson (2001) for the interpretation of rising and falling contours in interrogatives and declaratives. 9 This analysis was suggested to us as a possibility by H. Truckenbrodt. lO In this respect, preposed negation behaves like other constructions with non-canonical syntax that also encode particular discourse functions, like topicalization, Pocus preposing, etc (Kiss, 1981; Ward, 1988; Prince, 1998) ll The denotation of Q in the text gives Hamblin (1973) style question meanings.
Alternatively, we could follow Karttunen (1977) or Groenendi jk and Stokhof (1984) 
